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MIS/READING BERGSON— 
ON TIME AND LIFE 
AND MATTER
Suzanne GUERLAC
Because of the nature of his project, perhaps, and the requirements for 
writing it imposed, Bergson’s thought has not only been appropriated by 
various Bergsonisms, but it has also often been misread, by critical and 
sympathetic readers alike. I’d like to sketch out a few mis-readings of his 
work and consider whether they might, in the end, prove productive.
In his influential essay on Baudelaire, Walter Benjamin famously charged 
that Bergson “rejects any historical determination of memory,” thereby 
managing to “stay clear of that experience from which his own philosophy 
evolved, or rather, in reaction to which it arose […] the blinding age of big-
scale industrialism” (Benjamin 1968, 157). Benjamin was rehearsing the 
standard Frankfurt School view of Bergson when he refers to “the durée 
from which death has been eliminated” (Benjamin 1968, 185). In his 
1934 essay, “La métaphysique bergsonienne du temps,” Max Horkheimer 
criticised Bergson for not putting metaphysics “in dialectical relation with 
history” (Horkheimer 1983, 21).1 Bergson’s philosophy, Horkheimer writes, 
is “bound to fail [devait échouer]” (Horkheimer 1983, 18), because it ignores 
human history, relying on intuition in the place of philosophical operations 
of determinate negation. Substituting duration for the dialectical concept of 
development, Horkheimer writes, “Bergson, unintentionally, abstracts out 
‘real’ time and negates it [le nie]” (Horkheimer 1983, 19). In his celebrated 
formulation (to which Benjamin alludes) Bergson’s metaphysics “makes 
1. All translations of Merleau-Ponty (1967), Horkheimer (1983) and Soulez (1983) are mine. 
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death disappear [fait disparaître la mort]” (Horkheimer 1983, 20). Instead of 
taking historical knowledge as his point of departure, Bergson starts from a 
scientific perspective, Horkheimer affirms, alluding not to Bergson’s interest 
in mathematics and physics but to the treatment of the natural sciences 
in the context of German romanticism. What is needed, he maintains, is 
a Hegelian logic which “lets the negative act” (Horkheimer 1983, 21), a 
negativity he identifies with “the distress of individuals” (Horkheimer 1983, 
21). This is to approach Bergson from a Hegelian perspective. As Philippe 
Soulez has pointed out, “for Horkheimer, to think time can only mean to 
situate oneself in a horizon of dialectic” (Soulez 1983, 5). Moreover, he 
maintains, the Frankfurt School analysis depends upon a reading of Hegel 
that separates Hegel’s philosophy of history from his philosophy of nature. 
Alluding to the interpretations of Kojève and the early Sartre, Soulez 
writes: “For a certain generation, formed by a certain reading of Hegel, 
the specificity of Bergsonian discourse, namely a philosophy of the history 
of nature that does not yield a human philosophy, is unthinkable” (Soulez 
1983, 5). The human individual lies at the centre of philosophical reflection 
in the Frankfurt School context, where the individual is thought in relation 
to death. A “work of reason [travail rationnel] undertaken for the purpose 
of combatting death,” Horkheimer insists, lies at the heart of the historical 
project of emancipation — the project of “bringing about a happier 
humanity [instaurer une humanité plus heureuse]” (Horkheimer 1983, 21). 
This work of reason, Horkheimer maintains, not only implies, but requires, 
a “mastery of reality by spirit/reason [l’esprit]” (Horkheimer 1983, 25).
Frankfurt school thinkers have been a crucial philosophical reference for 
invaluable social projects that concern justice and human rights throughout 
the 20th  century. But today, in the 21st  century, we are compelled to 
consider a new set of conditions, circumstances which are directly related 
to the humanist program of progress that Horkheimer advanced. The 
mastery of reality by spirit/reason [l’esprit] entailed a mastery of nature 
that has led us into the age of the Anthropocene. Today we think death 
most urgently not in relation to the solitude and misery of the individual, 
or even in relation to war and genocide, but in relation to mass extinction 
and Earth crisis. The project of mastery — the ideology of progress so 
compatible with Hegelian logic and Marxist thought, as well as civilisation 
discourses — has led to the precarity of the very conditions of life on this 
planet. If a philosophy predicated on death — the work of the negative 
— propelled a century of social change, today we need to also think about 
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shared conditions of life — or livingness. I wonder whether, more than 
80 years after his essay, Horkheimer’s charge that Bergson’s is a philosophy 
of duration, not development, might not be viewed as an opportunity 
instead of a weakness: can we look to Bergson to inspire, or support, what 
some now call a post-development, which is to say post-capitalist, thinking 
(see Massumi 2018; Read and Alexander 2019)?
Were it not for the urgency that confronts us — how to think in the face of 
today’s planetary crisis — we might just thank Deleuze for making Bergson 
readable again by valorising nondialectical and non-humanist features of his 
thought, and for correcting Horkheimer’s view that Bergson’s metaphysics 
denies real time. But as temperatures rise, and species disappear, it is not 
Deleuze (or Deleuze-Bergson) that inspires, but Whitehead who wrote: 
“The doctrine that I am maintaining is that neither physical Nature nor life 
can be understood unless we fuse them together as essential factors in the 
composition of ‘really real’ things whose interconnections and individual 
characters constitute the universe” (Whitehead 1934, 57). The Deleuzian 
emphasis on ontology risks, as Horkheimer put it against Bergson, 
unintentionally abstracting out “real” time and life. Aiming toward what 
Whitehead calls the “really real,” I turn not to Deleuze but to Merleau-
Ponty’s lectures on Nature (1955-60), which, I will try to show, misread 
Bergson when they explicitly take up his thought, but do so within a broader 
argument that is not only haunted by Bergson but, more importantly, 
can refresh and enliven our reading of Bergson, moving us away from 
Horkheimer’s position (alive and well in some quarters) and also from the 
Horkheimer/Deleuze alternative and the Bergson-Deleuze hybrid.
Whereas Deleuze portrayed Bergson as an anti-philosopher, which had 
the effect of isolating him, Merleau-Ponty integrates him into a history 
of reflections on, and interrogations of, the concept of nature. His first 
mention of Bergson comes in connection with Schelling: “in one sense,” 
Merleau-Ponty writes, “all is interior to us, in another sense we are in 
the Absolute (cf. Bergson). This reciprocity is possible because we are 
no longer in a philosophy of Being […] we are in a philosophy of time” 
(Merleau-Ponty 2003, 48). Merleau-Ponty challenges Hegel’s critique of 
Schelling (which parallels Horkheimer’s critique of Bergson) and, when 
he turns his focus to Bergson, designates his thought a Naturphilosophie 
because of its intuition of a primordial ground, one Merleau-Ponty 
associates with Schelling’s Erste Natur, “the fundamental stuff of all life, 
and of every existing being” (Merleau-Ponty 2003, 38). Alluding to (but 
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not citing) Bergson’s famous opening line of Matter and Memory — 
“Here I am in the presence of images, in the vaguest sense of the word, 
images perceived when my senses are open to them, unperceived when 
they are closed [Me voici donc en présence d’images, au sens le plus vague où 
l’on peut prendre ce mot, images perçues quand j’ouvre mes sens, inaperçues 
quand je les ferme]” (Bergson 1988, 17; 2012, 11) — he posits nature 
as a “common medium of being and perception” (Merleau-Ponty 2003, 
56) — as primordial ground in this sense — and defines perception as “a 
fundamental act that installs us in the things” of nature (Merleau-Ponty 
2003, 53). Acknowledging that “we here guess at, more than we grasp, the 
thought of Bergson” (Merleau-Ponty 2003, 55), Merleau-Ponty proceeds 
to leave nature philosophy aside and to translate the nuanced argument 
of Bergson’s Matter and Memory (pace Horkheimer) into the dialectical 
terms of Sartre’s phenomenal ontology. “Bergson is embarrassed by this 
relation of Being to Nothingness” (Merleau-Ponty 2003, 58), he writes, 
concluding that “the true meaning of Bergsonian philosophy is not so 
much to eliminate the idea of Nothingness as to incorporate it into the 
idea of being” (Merleau-Ponty 2003, 66). In short (to go very quickly), 
Merleau-Ponty sees in Bergson a disappointing compromise position: on 
the one hand the promise of Schelling’s nature philosophy fails, there is a 
falling away from the primordial ground — an “unsticking” of perception 
“with respect to the real” (Merleau-Ponty 2003, 56) in Bergson’s distinction 
between pure perception and actual perception — and, on the other hand, 
the full promise of dialectical argument is not fulfilled.
Part of the problem is that Merleau-Ponty neglects to carry over to Bergson 
the crucial distinction he made in connection with Schelling between a 
philosophy of time and a philosophy of being. If Bergson’s argument in 
Matter and Memory is hard to follow, it is precisely because his is a philosophy 
of time. This is what makes it necessary for him to make two important 
distinctions in one complex and meandering argument: one between image 
(which he sometimes identifies with matter) and representation (which 
pertains, at this point in his argument, to perception) and another between 
the de jure schema of pure perception and real (or actual) perception. To 
the extent that he deals with them at all, Merleau-Ponty conflates these 
two arguments.
With Bergson’s “here I am in in the presence of images [Me voici donc en 
présence d’images]” (Bergson 1988, 17; 2012, 11), it is not a question of 
a perceiving consciousness — a je, for-itself or Nothingness — but rather 
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of a me, an image amidst all the other given images. This pronominal 
position (me) finds itself not in the presence of an object — an in-itself 
— but within a totality of other images that exists as an ensemble in flux 
and in flow. We are not dealing with a subject of consciousness placed 
before an object, as Bergson makes quite clear in his first example of pure 
perception: a primitive organism whose perception amounts to physical 
contact with an image outside itself. Bergson characterises the image, 
generally, as “being bound up with the totality of  all other images [solidaire 
de la totalité des autres images]” (Bergson 1988, 35; 2012, 32), such that 
it necessarily acts “through every one of its points upon all the points of 
all other images” (Bergson 1988, 36), transmitting “the whole of what it 
receives” (Bergson 1988, 36) and opposing “to every action an equal and 
contrary reaction” (Bergson 1988, 36). In the case of human beings (and 
all upper vertebrates) the body is an image and, at the same time, a centre 
of action (perception involves action, not knowledge). It is living matter.
The image (generally) is embedded temporally as well as spatially; it is 
continuous with (“se continue dans” (Bergson 2012, 32)) the images “which 
follow it” (Bergson 1988, 35), and “prolonged [prolongeait] those which 
preceded it” (Bergson 2012, 33; 1988, 36).2 To transform the “pure and 
simple existence” of the image into a representation, Bergson writes, “it 
would be enough to suppress [supprimer] what follows it [and] what precedes 
it” (Bergson 2012, 33; 1988, 36). In other words, if pure perception is a 
de jure schema abstracted from time, it is because extracting an image from 
time — from the flux and flow of the ensemble of images — is just what 
pure perception does. It cuts an image out of the temporal continuity of 
before and after and immobilises it in a representation through an action 
that marks out a present moment. And this is precisely why, when it comes 
to actual perception, Bergson will have to say there is no perception without 
memory. The perceiving body is also an image — one among the many — 
and so participates in the mouvant — the continuity of real time.
To carry out the act of perception that pulls an image outside time it is 
necessary to make a temporal synthesis, to contract a before and an after. 
In the case of more complex organisms, perception takes time because it 
requires the coordination of multiple sensory apparatuses that have varied 
reach and rhythm. This is where time comes in most explicitly in the case 
of living beings, i.e., as a hesitation between the receiving of movements 
or intensities and the returning of them back into the external world. This 
2. The tenses are interesting here.
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is what yields the “zones of indetermination” (Bergson 1988, 39) that 
Bergson speaks of in terms of hesitation and choice, which distinguish living 
beings from inanimate things that operate mechanically (or automatically) 
according to laws of nature. Perception becomes something like a projection 
of our incipient action into a specific site or location, and to this extent 
it both includes a temporal dimension that pertains to the future and 
filters the whole of the given to let pass only that part of it that interests 
our incipient action. And because we are part of the mouvant, the present 
moment registered by an action of perception will necessarily be covered 
with a layer of memory. Perception, in other words, has to retain the past so 
that it can pull itself together and act within an ensemble in flux and flow.
If there is no actual perception without memory (if perception is lined with 
memory) there is also no actual perception without affect, defined both as 
what the body absorbs into itself from the outside world and “that part or 
aspect of the inside of our body which we mix [mêlons] with the image of 
external bodies” (Bergson 2012, 59; 1988, 58). In either case “affection 
[affection] must, at a given moment, arise [surgir] out of the image” 
(Bergson 2012, 55; 1988, 55, italics original); “there is no perception 
without affection” (Bergson 1988, 58). In this sense actual perception, 
for Bergson, is a dual operation: it “measures our possible action upon 
things” and also “the possible action of things upon us” (Bergson 1988, 
56). It is this doubling, I think, that underlies the doubling of memory 
into a receptive memory of the body and a spontaneous image memory 
that operates through attentive recognition, but this would be a longer 
discussion (see Guerlac 2019). 
It you are familiar with Merleau-Ponty’s Nature lectures (or with the 
work of Jacob von Uexküll) you will have noticed that my selective 
discussion of Matter and Memory (my sketch of a reading of it) already 
suggests proximities between Bergson’s analysis of perception and what 
Merleau-Ponty will elaborate as behaviour [comportement] and discuss in 
connection with the animal body, and with von Uexküll’s theory of animal 
milieu or Umwelt. Indeed, Bergson’s characterisation of perception as what 
“measures our possible action on things and the possible action of things 
on us” (Bergson 1988, 205) aligns both with von Uexküll’s elaboration of 
the reciprocal relations of animal bodies and Umwelt and with Merleau-
Ponty’s analysis of the intertwining relations of comportment.
When we examine Merleau-Ponty’s broader argument, we can appreciate 
that, in spite of his misreading of Bergson in Sartrean terms, the 
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perspective he develops in the Nature lectures can usefully reorient our 
reading of Bergson, bringing out resonances like the one just mentioned 
that might be of importance to us today. But before we can make this case, 
we must backtrack a bit. In the introduction to his 1942 La Structure du 
comportement (Merleau-Ponty 1967),3 Merleau-Ponty set comportment 
up as a matter of relations between consciousness and nature; we remain 
within a framework of the for-itself and the in-itself. In the Nature lectures, 
however, he presents comportment as neither thing nor consciousness. No 
longer primary (as required in a phenomenological analysis) consciousness 
itself becomes “a type of comportment” (Merleau-Ponty 2003, 167, 
translation altered). Only one of many forms of behaviour, it “must not 
be defined from within, from its own point of view, but such as we grasp 
it across the bodies of others” (Merleau-Ponty 2003, 167, my italics). The 
notion of comportment (which he borrows from the neuro-embryologist 
G. E. Coghill and the clinical psychologist Arnold Gesell, with Catherine 
Strunk Amatuda) enables Merleau-Ponty to escape the alternative of the 
pour soi and the en soi in the Nature lectures, although he continues to read 
Bergson through this Sartrean framework. We could say that Merleau-
Ponty misreads Bergson in the Nature lectures to the extent that he is unable 
to align Bergson’s treatment of perception with his own evolving notion 
of comportment, one that moves beyond the mechanistic understanding 
of behaviourism toward an (ironically quite Bergsonian) thinking of 
concrete, meaningful, oriented, indeterminacy that Merleau-Ponty will 
identify both with Nature and with a concept of life.
Physical things, Merleau-Ponty wrote in his 1942 study, “find the 
satisfactory explanation of inner unity in mathematical law; the others, 
which we call living beings [les vivants] present the distinctive characteristic 
of having a comportment, which is to say that their actions are not 
comprehensible as functions of a physical milieu and that, on the contrary, 
the parts of the world to which they react are delimited for them by an 
inner norm [norme intérieure]” (Merleau-Ponty 1967, 173). As we see in 
this statement, comportment refocuses our attention on the question of 
life — comportment is “a category of life” (Merleau-Ponty 1967, 168) — 
and introduces into it the factor of the physical environment of livingness 
(“the parts of the world to which [living beings] react” (Merleau-Ponty 
3. In the subsequent translations, I have translated “comportement” as “comportment” 
instead of behaviour to avoid associations with behaviourism, from which Merleau-Ponty 
wanted to distinguish his term. 
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1967, 173)) that Merleau-Ponty will elaborate in the Nature lectures 
through the term Umwelt he borrows from Jacob von Uexküll, who recasts 
a mechanistic concept of milieu as a reciprocal relation. The organism, 
Merleau-Ponty writes, “modifies its own milieu according to the inner 
norm [norme intérieure] of its activity” (Merleau-Ponty 1967, 206). He 
characterises this inner norm as “a certain type of transitive action that 
characterises the individual,” adding “it measures the action of things on 
it and delimits its milieu” (Merleau-Ponty 1967, 199). He describes the 
inner norm as a privileged attitude of a singular type of living being that 
gives unity to a concrete mode of comportment, which, in turn, gives 
unity to the evolving, or maturing, organism over time — the unity, we 
could say, of the living being in its livingness. This is what Merleau-Ponty 
characterises as the “unity of signification” (Merleau-Ponty 1967, 207) 
of an organism; he also refers to it as its “vital signification [signification 
vitale]” (Merleau-Ponty 2003, 161, 173). This idea of signification, he 
acknowledges, permits him to “conserve the category of life without the 
hypothesis of a vital force” (Merleau-Ponty 2003, 160). He takes his 
distance from Bergson in this way.
But Merleau-Ponty will carry forward a certain Bergsonian impulse in 
the Nature lectures. Summarising the argument of G. E. Coghill in his 
Anatomy and the Problem of Behaviour (1929), he explains that what makes 
the unity of comportment meaningful (vitally meaningful, we could say) is 
time. “We cannot define the animal by its immediate function,” he writes, 
“[…] the apparatus has meaning only for the future” (Merleau-Ponty 2003, 
144). This is because “time is characteristic of the Umwelt” (Merleau-Ponty 
2003, 173). Comportment unfurls in the organism, which also unfurls 
its own unity through its comportment: it is necessary, Merleau-Ponty 
writes, to “examine […] the animal in time and contemplate […] the 
unfurling of the animal […] knowing how it takes possession of its body 
and its milieu” (Merleau-Ponty 2003, 144). Comportment, which refers 
to a manner (or style) of action is, as Merleau-Ponty writes, “emergent” 
(Merleau-Ponty 2003, 144); this emergence pertains to the organism, to 
its comportment and to the animal’s Umwelt, that is, the environment of 
this comportment, which is transformed by it (all of this will be picked up 
by Georges Canguilhem).
In his 1942 study, Merleau-Ponty complains that the problem with what 
he calls Bergson’s “refined vitalism” (Merleau-Ponty 1967, 171) is that “the 
relation of the élan vital to what it produces is not thinkable, it is magical” 
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(Merleau-Ponty 1967, 171). In the Nature lectures, however, where it is a 
question of comportment, the question of what is discursively thinkable 
no longer seems to worry him. He enthusiastically cites von Uexküll’s 
comparison of “the unfurling of an Umwelt” to a “melody that is singing 
itself ” (Merleau-Ponty 2003, 173). Elaborating this figure, he explains that 
melody, incarnated in the animal, gives us “a particular consciousness of 
time” (Merleau-Ponty 2003, 174). “In a melody,” he writes, “a reciprocal 
influence between the first and the last note takes place, and we have to 
say that the first note is only possible because of the last and vice versa […] 
it is in this way,” Merleau-Ponty concludes, “that things happen in the 
construction of a living being” (Merleau-Ponty 2003, 174). Melody, of 
course, was Bergson’s privileged figure for qualitative duration in Time and 
Free Will. And there too it stands for a certain kind of unity that Bergson 
identifies with the living being. Speaking of the notes of a melody in 
chapter three of Time and Free Will, Bergson writes that “their totality may 
be compared to a living being whose parts, although distinct, permeate 
one another just because they are so closely connected [par l’effet même de 
leur solidarité]” (Bergson 1913, 100; 2013, 75). He characterises this unity 
of living beings as “an interconnexion and organisation of elements, each 
one of which represents the whole, and cannot be distinguished or isolated 
from it […]” (Bergson 1913, 101). When Merleau-Ponty characterises 
the unity figured by melody he echoes Bergson quite precisely: melody, 
he writes, figures “an adhesion between the elements of the multiple” 
(Merleau-Ponty 2003, 156).
My main point is not that Merleau-Ponty misreads Bergson and then 
re-appropriates his thought — substituting von Uexküll’s unfurling for 
Bergson’s élan vital. It is not even that Bergson haunts Merleau-Ponty’s 
Nature lectures (where haunting, and specifically the haunting of melody, 
is a theme). My point is that the path Merleau-Ponty chooses for this re-
appropriation of features of Bergson’s thought — comportment considered 
in relation to the animal body as an approach to the question of Nature — 
can recalibrate, even reorient, our reading of Bergson to the extent that it 
articulates time and life in connection with the material world. Specifically, it 
redirects our attention to the importance of the body in Bergson’s thought 
and, more broadly, to relations between duration and materiality. Merleau-
Ponty’s Nature lectures invite us to reconsider Bergson from a perspective 
that links questions of life or livingness to the issues of time and emergent 
totality that they imply.
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To sketch this out (which is all I can hope to do here) we would need to 
reconsider precisely the features of Bergson’s analysis in Matter and Memory 
that Merleau-Ponty neglects in his account of Bergson — memory and 
affectivity — and to think them together. In Bergson, where time is defined 
as the registered difference between a before and an after, it is memory 
that gives us access to time. Bergson usually speaks of consciousness in 
connection with the registration of this difference — this difference in 
continuity — that he calls memory. The detour through Merleau-Ponty 
invites us to read the notion of consciousness in relation to the pragmatics 
of perception that we evoked earlier. Merleau-Ponty also presents time 
(the time of emergence that is “characteristic of Umwelt” (Merleau-Ponty 
2003, 173)) as a play of before and after that he identifies with melody 
(echoing von Uexküll explicitly and Bergson implicitly) and characterises 
through the gesture of unfurling. The important point for our reading of 
Bergson is not only that this quite Bergsonian conception of time emerges 
from a consideration of the body, but also that it depends upon reciprocal 
relations between these active bodies and the immediate environment of 
their actions — the Umwelt. It calls our attention to the fact that this was 
implicit in Bergson’s account of perception in Matter and Memory when 
Bergson writes, for example, that “the objects which surround my body 
reflect [the body’s] possible action [l’action possible] upon them” (Bergson 
1988, 21; 2012, 16), and that perception “measures our possible action 
upon things and thereby, inversely, the possible action of things upon 
us [mesure notre action possible sur les choses et par là inversement, l’action 
possible des choses sur nous]” (Bergson 1988, 56; 2012, 57).
Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of an organism’s comportment in its 
intertwining relation to the physical environment — the milieu (Umwelt) 
of this comportment — invites us to reconsider memory in Bergson, 
not only image memory, but also, and most importantly, the memory 
of the body as it relates to affectivity: the absorption into the body of 
some of what it receives from the outside through what Bergson calls a 
perceptual “shock [ébranlement]” (Bergson 2012, 108, my translation), a 
gentle intimation of Benjamin’s modernist shock. “Behaviour,” Merleau-
Ponty writes, “oriented toward an Umwelt begins […] as soon as we have 
stimulations that act, not by simple physical presence, but insofar as an 
organism is disposed to receive them and treat them as signals” (Merleau-
Ponty 2003, 167). This invites us to consider what Bergson calls affect not 
merely as “intensity,” in the wake of Deleuze and Brian Massumi (who 
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tend to efface the specificity of livingness in Bergson’s thought) but as 
a specific feature of “living matter [matière vivante]” (Bergson 1988, 28; 
2012, 24), one that pertains to how it holds the past and moves into the 
future. To the extent that perception, in Bergson, involves action in a 
temporal field (where the present is on its way to becoming past) the past 
— the lived time — that it holds onto would consist of its perceptual and 
affective interactions with its milieu or Umwelt, which could be said to 
survive in the body. In relation to what he calls the memory of the body in 
Matter and Memory, Bergson speaks of channels in, and through, the body 
that register encounters with the outside world and lay down passages of 
reception which guide potential responses to these encounters, or, we could 
say, receives signals from the external world. The neurological channels are 
produced by, and produce, tendencies. We might read these tendencies 
in relation to what Merleau-Ponty calls inner norms, which, generated 
in conjunction with specific bodily conformations or complexities, orient 
(without determining) future actions. The reference to the future that 
Merleau-Ponty associates with the “unfurling” of comportment (which in 
turn gives unity to the living being) is to be thought, he says, in terms of a 
“plurality of phenomena [that] bind together and constitute an ensemble 
that has meaning” (Merleau-Ponty 2003, 153). This was the thrust of his 
understanding of von Uexküll’s appeal to the melody figure.
“We find models of this idea of totality,” Merleau-Ponty writes, “in the 
world of perception” where “[…] nothing impedes the whole for being 
other than the sum of its parts without being for all that a transcendent 
entity” (Merleau-Ponty 2003, 153). The Umwelt unfurls in a movement 
of signification vitale that bears a certain affinity to Bergson’s élan vital. 
But reading Bergson through Merleau-Ponty’s Nature lectures checks any 
tendency we might have either to read this élan in spiritualist terms or to 
read it abstractly, with Deleuze, in terms of logics of multiplicities and an 
ontology of the virtual. Deleuze rhetorically asks:
What does Bergson mean when he talks about élan vital? It is always a case of 
a virtuality in the process of being actualised […] a totality in the process of 
dividing up. Proceeding ‘by dissociation and division,’ by ‘dichotomy’, is the 
essence of life […] Duration, to be precise, is called life when it appears in this 
movement (Deleuze 1991, 94-95). 
Deleuze abstracts a notion of life from Creative Evolution without reference 
to Bergson’s previous works, having posited a rupture between the earlier 
works, deemed psychological in nature, and the ontological framework 
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initiated in Creative Evolution. If we read Bergson’s élan vital through 
the detour of Merleau-Ponty’s Nature lectures, we can construe it more 
concretely in relation to Time and Free Will and Matter and Memory. The 
broader terrain of textual reference suggests relation to an environment 
that intertwines with the unfurling of the movement — the activity or 
comportment — of a living body, which is not always a human one.
Deleuze’s ontological perspective involves “a totality in the process of 
dividing up,” but for Merleau-Ponty in the Nature lectures totality is not 
the answer — not what is given — but precisely the most important 
question, a question raised by the articulation of Umwelt and inner norm 
that come together in comportment. If, on the level of the organism, totality 
“appears as emergent” (Merleau-Ponty 2003, 145), and therefore cannot 
be described in physiological terms, “what status,” Merleau-Ponty asks, 
“must we give totality?” (Merleau-Ponty 2003, 145). His reply should not 
entirely surprise us: “Such is the philosophical question […] which is at 
the centre of this course on the idea of nature, and maybe of the whole of 
philosophy” (Merleau-Ponty 2003, 145). The intertwining that he locates 
in the reciprocal relations between organism and Umwelt extends to an 
overlapping (or intertwining) of relations between the Umwelten themselves, 
relations that compose what he calls “nature” as, precisely, “the Umwelten 
of Umwelten” (Merleau-Ponty 2003, 177). What is more, this emergent 
totality is oriented — it has, as it were, its own inner norm — in that, as 
Merleau-Ponty writes, “the envelopment of an Umwelt by another is required 
for its own” (Merleau-Ponty 2003, 177, my emphasis). We could say that the 
movement of totalisation is oriented from within, that it occurs in relation 
to something like tendencies or inner norms, which in turn are related to 
specific material sites. For Merleau-Ponty himself, the intertwining that runs, 
over time, from the simplest organism all the way up to, and through, what 
he calls Nature is just what the figure of the melody that sings itself conveys.
Returning now to Bergson, we must mention one more refinement of the 
melody figure, one that our detour through Merleau-Ponty might help us 
better appreciate. In Duration and Simultaneity Bergson extends the reach 
of duration beyond the individual inner experience of qualitative duration, 
figured by melody in Time and Free Will, and even beyond the evolutionary 
framework he presents in Creative Evolution (the élan vital), to what he 
calls a “duration of the universe” (Bergson 1999, 31). In this context time 
becomes explicitly “the very stuff of our existence and of all things” (Bergson 
1999, 43, italics mine), a formulation that ties the living being to its physical 
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surroundings in a temporal ontology. We note the resonance with Schelling 
here, since Bergson refers to “real time” as time “perceived and lived” 
(Bergson 1999, 33). But at this point Bergson also begins to sound a bit like 
Merleau-Ponty, if we read backwards from him. Bergson writes:
To each moment of our inner life […] corresponds a moment of our body and 
of all environing matter that is ‘simultaneous’ with it; this matter then seems 
to participate in our conscious duration. Gradually, we extend this duration to 
the whole physical world, because we see no reason to limit it to the immediate 
vicinity of our body. The universe itself seems to us to form a single whole; and 
if the part that is around us endures in our manner, the same must hold, […] for 
that part which, in turn, is surrounded, and so on indefinitely. Thus is born the 
idea of a duration of the universe (Bergson 1999, 31).
This account of the “duration of the universe” (Bergson 1999, 31) aligns 
with Merleau-Ponty’s depiction of nature as the “Umwelt of Umwelten” 
in a process of unfurling. It is an argument by analogy (a corrective to the 
practices of intelligence which have evolved to further the instrumental 
interests of humans, as Bergson argues in Creative Evolution) that brings 
us back around to the melody figure — but with a difference. Bergson 
compares the “basic time” (Bergson 1999, 30) involved in the duration of 
the universe — a “physical time” (Bergson 1999, 32) — to listening to a 
melody. But this time, he insists that, as we listen, we must “do away with 
the distinctive features of sound itself, retaining of it only the continuation 
of what precedes into what follows and the uninterrupted transition, 
multiplicity without divisibility and successions without separation” 
(Bergson 1999, 30). This, he writes, is how we would “rediscover basic 
time,” how we would pass from “inner time to the time of things” (Bergson 
1999, 30, my italics).
Does the time of the universe — basic time, or the time of things — 
eradicate the reference to consciousness, as Deleuze suggests? No. “It is 
impossible,” Bergson continues, “to conceive a connecting link between 
the before and after” — i.e., duration — “without an element of memory 
or consciousness” (Bergson 1999, 33). But he adds this crucial point 
of clarification: “We may perhaps feel averse to the use of the word 
‘consciousness’ if an anthropomorphic sense is attached to it. But to 
imagine a thing that endures there is no need to take one’s own memory 
and transport it, even attenuated, into the interior of the thing” (Bergson 
1999, 33), no need, he clarifies, to presume “a human character of memory” 
(Bergson 1999, 33). “Indeed,” he adds emphatically, “it is the opposite 
course we must follow” (Bergson 1999, 33). Instead of human memory, 
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what is at stake here is the minimal consciousness that we presuppose in an 
act of perception or registration of the real, such as we find even in primitive 
organisms (as in the example of the perception already noted). This is what 
Bergson refers to as “elementary memory,” which is impersonal — we 
could call it a memory of the universe. It is “memory within change itself ” 
(Bergson 1999, 30) that Bergson identifies with transition, as between the 
frames of the cinematograph that he proposes as a figure for intelligence 
in Creative Evolution. Even here (as in von Uexküll’s theory of Umwelt) 
there is a requirement of perception: “We require the property of being 
perceived or perceptible for everything held up as real” (Bergson 1999, 46). 
If, as Bergson affirmed in Matter and Memory, there is no actual perception 
without memory — “in actuality [en fait] there is no perception which 
is not full of [imprégnée de] memories” (Bergson 1988, 33; 2012, 30) — 
the reverse also appears to be the case : there is no memory — indeed no 
time — without some mode of perception. Melody (now without qualities 
or the nuances of sound) is the way Bergson writes this elementary and 
impersonal memory of things that connects a before and an after — this 
“duration of the universe” (Bergson 1999, 31).
What the detour through Merleau-Ponty’s examination of Nature 
introduces into our reading of Bergson is, first of all, the explicit focus 
on life as it reaches beyond human life. Umwelt, through which Merleau-
Ponty constructs his concept of Nature as an Umwelt of Umwelten, is, 
we remember, a category of life. Claude Bernard was one of the first to 
insist that the categories of life and milieu go together. Of course, Bergson 
famously treats life quite explicitly from the perspective of evolution in 
Creative Evolution, where it is a question of life forms. For contemporary 
readers however, Deleuze’s judgement that this work marks a turning 
point in Bergson’s work — a shift from a psychological to an ontological 
framework — has tended to efface our appreciation of the importance 
of life in all Bergson’s writings. What the detour through Merleau-Ponty 
reinforces is the link between the question of life and time (which even 
the appeal to ontology, as an ontology of being, tends to arrest, as distinct, 
say, from the ontogenesis Gilbert Simondon proposes in a spirit much 
closer to Bergson).4 We can’t think Umwelt without time. But what it also 
reinforces, perhaps even more importantly, is the link between life and 
materiality, with which it is actively intertwined — the relations, we could 
4. For the notion of ontogenesis see Simondon (2017); he characterises it as a becoming 
of being where the becoming modifies it. For its relation to Bergson, see Guerlac (2021).
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say, between living matter and nonliving matter. Alerted to this possibility, 
we can attend to Bergson when he writes that “something of our body 
and environing matter enters into our perception” (Bergson 1999, 31, my 
emphasis). We don’t have to argue about whether, as Bergson seemed to 
say in his early work, time only pertains to living beings. We don’t have to 
argue about the limits between the living and the nonliving categorically 
(which is to say abstractly). We can consider these questions concretely, 
which is to say in relation to a dynamic scale of relations rather than a 
categorical opposition. This is Bergson’s approach, whether it is a question 
of the two extremes of mental life he proposes in Matter and Memory — 
action and dream — or the two modalities of understanding he opposes in 
Creative Evolution — intelligence and intuition — while appealing to all 
the degrees in between the two.
Time, life (human, animal and plant) bodies of all sorts and the duration 
of the universe — these are the questions we need to address today, in the 
face of the fragility of our planet. The detour through Merleau-Ponty’s 
Nature lectures invites us to reconsider the dimension of natural history 
that, as Philippe Soulez indicated, was separated out from the concerns 
of human history by a generation of 20th century dialectical thinkers for 
whom “a philosophy of the history of nature that does not yield a human 
philosophy [was] unthinkable” (Soulez 1983, 5). Perhaps just the reverse 
is true today: we cannot think a human philosophy without learning to 
think in more than human terms as well. In the context of our extinction 
crisis, which reaches across the globe, we begin to hear other discourses — 
Native American, or other indigenous voices, for example — that speak 
with ease and authority about life as it passes through all living beings, 
and about how to protect it. Can Bergson help us find our way into this 
discussion? In 1932 Bergson asked us to decide if we wanted to go on 
living. The question still stands, and Bergson still has something to say 
to us about it. Are we going to continue to deny or ignore the facts about 
our planet? Are we are going to place our hopes in the same human logics 
that contributed to the crisis we face, and capitulate to the seductions 
of technological, or piecemeal geo-engineering, solutions to the planetary 
crisis? Or are we going to think duration instead of development and learn 
to read duration as a duration of the universe that puts life and matter in 
dynamic relation to one another through dynamics of livingness?
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Abstract: Can it be productive to consider misreadings of Bergson? We recall Max 
Horkheimer’s critique of Bergson and reconsider it from the vantage point of Merleau-
Ponty in a trajectory that moves us away from the Horkheimer/ Bergson alternative and 
also from the Bergson-Deleuze hybrid. In his Nature lectures Merleau-Ponty misreads 
Bergson when he explicitly takes up his thought, but he does so within a broader argument 
that is not only haunted by Bergson but, more importantly, can refresh and enliven our 
reading of him, giving us a new appreciation for what Bergson called “the duration of 
the universe.” Our attention is redirected to imbrications of time and life in Bergson and 
to relations between matter and living matter — the kind of dynamic relations Merleau-
Ponty will evoke through Umwelt as it pertains to a more than human universe. If a 
philosophy predicated on the work of the negative propelled a century of social change, 
Bergson can help us to learn to think livingness in the face of an all too fragile planet.
Keywords: Henri Bergson, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, nature, livingness, duration of the 
universe, Umwelt.
Résumé  : Peut-il être productif de prendre en considération les lectures erronées de 
Bergson ? Nous rappelons la critique de Bergson par Max Horkheimer et la reconsidérons 
du point de vue de Merleau-Ponty dans une trajectoire qui nous éloigne de l’alternative 
Horkheimer/Bergson et aussi de l’hybride Bergson-Deleuze. Dans ses conférences sur la 
nature, Merleau-Ponty interprète mal Bergson lorsqu’il reprend explicitement sa pensée, 
mais il le fait dans le cadre d’une argumentation plus large qui n’est pas seulement hantée 
par Bergson mais, plus important encore, qui peut nous en rafraîchir et animer la lecture, en 
nous donnant une nouvelle appréciation de ce que Bergson appelait “la durée de l’univers.” 
Notre attention est redirigée vers l’imbrication du temps et de la vie chez Bergson et vers 
les relations entre la matière et la matière vivante — le genre de relations dynamiques que 
Merleau-Ponty évoquera à travers l’Umwelt dans sa relation avec un univers plus qu’humain. 
Si une philosophie fondée sur le travail du négatif a propulsé un siècle de changement 
social, Bergson peut nous aider à apprendre à penser le vivant face à une planète trop fragile.
Mots-clés : Henri Bergson, Maurice-Merleau-Ponty, nature, vivant, durée de l’univers, 
Umwelt.

